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Introduction

The Moldovan Confederation Conundrum
Stephen R. Bowers,

vaIena. Ciobanu , and Marion T. Doss, Jr.
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The decade-long debate about the creation of a "common state" in Moldova has
had great significance for both Gaguzia, the poor region in the southern part of the
Moldovan Republic, and the so-called Dniester Moldovan Republic or Transdniestria in
the eastern part of Moldova. Questions about the status of both entities have been
couched in terms of politics, history, sociology, economics, linguistics, and even
international relations. Of most immediate concern is the concept of collective rights and
the impact that their recognition may have on prospects for resolving the ancient ethnic
contlicts whose violent reappearance has marred the region's post-communist
transformation. While the Transdniester contlict is not directly associated with this issue,
the Gagauz situation represents a textbook example of how autonomy based on ethnicity
can have a positive impact on ethnic contlict. Phrased in academic terms, the question is
this: will the interests of the people of Moldova, Gagauzia, and Transdniestria be best
served by a confederation or by a federal union? For the former USSR, with its mixture
of ethnic confrontations, the answer to this dilemma is of special relevance. Given those
circumstances, it is likely that the eventual answer will come within the context of
political dictates rather than scholarly speculation.

Gagauzia
Locations of Gagauz Communities
While we associate Gagauzia with Moldova, there are Gagauz communities in
other nations. However, the largest (most populous) Gagauz community is in Moldova,
where it has obtained a special grant of autonomy in a territory called Gagauz Yeri
(Gagauzland) or Gagauzia. The Moldovan Gagauz live in five southern regions of the
Republic: Comrat, Ceadir-Lunga, Basarabeasca, Tarac\ia and Vulcane~ti. Collectively,
these regions where the Gagauz represent more than 50% of the popUlation were
considered part of Gagauzia. In other districts, where the Moldovans or the Bulgarians
are the majority, a referendum was conducted on March 5, 1995 to determine whether
they would be included as a part of Gagauzia. Based on that referendum, 6 out of the 10
districts involved agreed to join Gagauzia. As a result, Gagauzia now consists of a total
of some 30 districts, 24 of which have a majority population of Gagauz. The Comrat
region consists of twelve districts, Ceadir-Lunga of six, while Basarabeasca, Taraclia and
Vulcane~ti consist of four districts each. Altogether, about 150,000 Gagauz live in
Moldova, most of them in Gagauzia.
An additional 31,967 Gagauz live in Ukraine, mostly in the former Romanian
regions Ismail and Cetatea Alba. Within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
about 10,000 Gagauz live in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Siberia. They originally moved
to Basarabia about 1909-1910 and were deported from Basarabia between 1941-1949 by
the Soviets.
Bulgaria boasts a Gagauz population of about 10,000 ethnic Gagauz, most of
whom live in the Cadrilater and Varna the regions. As a matter of fact, many historians
th
trace the roots of the Gagauz nation to this part of Bulgaria in the lih and 13 centuries.
Between 1770-1830 they migrated to Basarabia. Another 5000 Gagauz live in western
Bulgaria (Custendil, Pirotsk, Botevgrad), eastern Serbia (Nis), and in Macedonia (the
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country). In Greece, there are Gagauz living in seven villages on the river Strimmon in
northern Macedonia (the province). The Greek Gagauz are referred to as Urumi.
In Romania, Gagauz noW live in Mangalia and in the surrounding communities of
Vama Veche, Ion Corvin, Deleni, Petreni and Sipote. After the First World War, while
traveling to Tu\cea, the historian C. Lascarov located seven Gagauz villages. Most were
like Cataloi, where Romanians, Gagauz and Italians lived together in harmony. In
Techirghiol, another scholar, M. Sanielievici, reported meeting a beautiful Gagauz
woman. Even Nicolae Iorga, during his wanderings through the Romanian countryside,
records having made a trip from Tulcea to Constanta in a carriage driven by a Gagauz.
With the war in Crimea, a new wave of Tatars from Crimea came to Dobrogea.
A
104
witness from the village Caraibil (today Colina) told the researcher A\, P. Arbore that
they were br~lUght from Crimea to the big Gagauz village Beidaud and then to Sarinasuf,
Murighiol. lO ) More recently, A. Oi~teanu and Luca Pitu met and wrote about the
Gagauz. 106 These writers met Gagauz in the villages Doi Mai and Vama Veche. In the
rest of Romania, the Gagauz are refugees from Basarabia. Many of them have not
registered themselves as Gagauz during the censuS, taking into account that there are a lot
of mixed marriages and that the Gagauz are orthodox as well. Moreover, some names are
common to the Romanian language: Topal, Ciolac, Chi or, Uyun, Urum, Cheies,
Arabagiu, Catargiu, Topciu, Dragan, Ciachir, and Coiciu.

Historical Development of the Gagauz Dispute

Small communities such as the Gagauz were vulnerable to pressure from the
Russian empire and later from the Bolshevik successor state. The Soviet period was an
especially difficult time for small nationalities to maintain their identities. Many small
nations, overcome by the pressures of Russification, disappeared completely under Soviet
control. Given the fact that assimilation was a norm of Russian imperialism, non-Russian
communities were often doomed to disappear.
During the Stalinist years the Gagauz su ffered greatly and in 1944 thousands of
them were forced into labor camps. In the immediate post-World War Two years, a
severe famine gripped the area and approximately one half of the Gagauz population died
in 1946 and 1947. This humanitarian crisis was coupled with a post-war legal
environment in which collective rights were not recognized. Because of a widespread
belief that Nazi aggression had been facilitated by the concept of national selfdetermination and the notion of collective minority rights, international law embraced a
universal concept of human rights in which individuals rather than communities enjoyed
protection. Thus, cases involving national minorities were not part of the new agenda of
international law. The Gagauz were among the people who paid a price for the postWorld War Two legal changes as well as for the inability of communism to solve the
much-discussed national question. A practical consequence of this environment was that
in Gagauzia no Gagauz people held any positions of importance. Such key posts were
always in the hands of Ukrainians or Russians.
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"Contributions to the Study of the Tatars and Turks" -Archive of Dobrog ea , n, 1919, nr. 3-4, pag. 229
Stoica Lascu _ Foreign travelers about the Turks and TalClrsfrolll Dobrogea - celi. XVlII- XIX - The
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prominent of these intellectuals is Professor Dionis Tanasoglu, the Chair of Gagauz
history, language and literature at the Pedagogic University "Ion Creanga" from
Chisinau .
In Tanasoglu's view, the Gagauz population will best develop within the Republic
of Moldova and without territorial delimitation. According to Tanasoglu, only a broad
grant of cultural autonomy is necessary for such a development to be effective, This, he
maintains, is embodied in the 1994 laws and reflects a practical application of the concept
of collective rights,110

Factions within the Gagauz Leadership
Political power in Gagauzia lies, for the most part, in the hands of the Gagauz
People's Assembly and the mayors of the main cities, The current Bashkan is Dmitry
Croitor, who was elected in September 1999, While the Bashkan appears dominant over
the People's Assembly, Speaker of the Assembly Mikhail Kendiglian enjoys great power
and speaks on behalf of those regarded as the hardliners, In this orientation, he is joined
by the mayor of Comrat, Constantin Taushanjy, another of the region's hardliners.
It is essential to recognize that there are important political differences within the
Gagauz community, For example, the distance in miles between Ceadir-Lunga and
Comrat is minimal but there are major differences in the approaches of these
communities to the political situation in Gagauzia. The mayor of Ceadir-Lunga, Mikhail
Formuzal, describes this as a contrast between the radicalism of Comrat and the
pragmatism of his community. He points to a long-standing "revolutionary tradition" in
Com rat, a town that participated in the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, This tradition has
prompted Comrat's officials to start confrontations with Moldovan authorities and to
inject a more emotional attitude into the debate with Chisinau, By contrast, according to
Mayor Formuzal, Ceadir-Lunga's pragmatic approach encourages the development of
cooperative approaches that will help alleviate the town's severe economic and social
problems, Such an approach is natural for this community which has no revolutionary
tradition and was completely unaffected by the Bolshevik Revolution,
Mayor Formuzal, a pragmatist who is oriented toward the development of service
institutions to meet the social needs of Ceadir-Lunga, is the principal opposition figure in
Gagauzia, His administration has been characterized by the creation of homes for the
elderly who would otherwise be without places to stay, the effort to secure medicines and
other necessities for the city's poorly-equiped hospital, and a determination to follow a
course of cooperation with Chisinau, Unlike Comrat, with its often-tense atmosphere,
Ceadir-Lunga is a more open society in which outsiders, especially Westerners, are
greeted with curiosity and, increasingly, warmth,lll Formuzal's outreach efforts have
brought not only a more cordial relationship with the Chisinau political establishment
but, more important for the city's living conditions, contacts with Western groups
interested in helping this region survive the rigors of a political, economic, and social
transformation that has had devastating consequences on many towns in the former
USSR, Outside support for Formuzal's non-ideological reform program has, during the
past year, come in the form of financial contributions from a Scandinavian
philanthropists who bought a furnace for the buildings that Formuzal transformed into a
::~ Inlerview with Professor Dionis TanusogJu, Chisinau, 6 October 2000,
Mayor Formuzal has referred to Comrat as a dictatorship, Interview with the mayor in Ceadir-Lunga, 9
October 2000,
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retirement home and additional support from an American university, James Madison
University in Virginia, whose students raised money for another furnace, heating fuel,
and Christmas packages for many of Ceadir-Lunga's more destitute families.
Fiodor Terzi, the mayor of Vulci'ine!?ti, is widely regarded as a centrist who
attempts to advance some elements of practical reform without alienating the Comrat
political establishment. Local observers of the Gagauz political environment feel that the
Formuzal approach enjoys more support among the ranks of the city and town
administrators throughout Gagauzia.
The role of Vulci'ine~ti has become especially crucial in the political tug of war in
Gagauzia. Together with Comrat and Ceadir-Lunga, it is one of the three centers which
will detemline the political direction of the entire Gagauz region. While Vulcanei?ti is the
smallest of the three cities, it benefits from the permanently hostile relationship between
the leaderships of Comrat and Ceadir-Lunga. The latter cities are almost equa\1y balanced
in tenns of numbers of registered voters. Thus, Vulcane~ti has become the pivotal distTict
that can determine the outcome of the political contests in Gagauzia. Thus, Fiodor Terzi's
the centrist position represents not only a political choice but also an effective political
tactic.
Over the past year the situation has become more complicated because of the
determination of some of the Gagauz leaders, like Kendiglian, Croitor and Taushanjy, to
secure more seats in the Moldovan Parliament. Their strategy is to gain more influence in
Chisinau ratber than concentrate on the economical and social problems of the region.
Many politicians in Cbisinau predict early elections for the Bashkan of Gaguzia because
of the unresolved conflicts between Gagauz radicals and Gagauz pragmatists. Enduring
tensions between the People's Assembly and the Bashkan's office are the root cause of
the effort to call for early elections. One of the potential candidates for the Bashkan office
is the pragmatic Mikhail Formuzal. In response to Formuzal's likely candidacy,
Kendiglian and Croitor are working to undennine Formuzal's position as mayor of
Ceadir-Lunga.

The Current Political Situation
Many observers have praised Moldova for how tactfully it has dealt with the
Gagauz problem. While the Tiraspol-Chisinau relationship degenerated into full-scale
hostilities, there was only limited violence as the Gagauz and Moldovan leaders advanced
their respective cases. In the early stages of what we refer to as the Gagauz crisis, the
Gagauz leadership threatened Moldova and declared their intention to achieve statehood
even at the cost of violence. However, with the collapse of the government of former
Prime Minister Mircea Druc, Moldovan authorities assumed a more moderate stance that
encouraged a reciprocal response from even the most hard-line of the Gagauz leadership.
When Chisinau sought and accepted assistance from Turkey, the situation improved even
more. Turkey appealed to the ethnic impulses of the ethnic Gagauz and effectively
estranged them from Moscow and limited Russian influence upon them. The visit of the
Turkish President Suleiman Demirel, at the invitation of Moldovan President Mircea
Snegur, ameliorated the actions of the Gagauz leaders.
Today, Moldova controls Gagauzia's external relations as well as the region's
defense. Gagauzia has dissolved its military organization and accepted the authority of
the Moldovan Army. This authority extends to frontier protection, so Moldovan officials
supervise Gagauzia's only frontier, that with Ukraine. The supreme authorities of
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share of the legitimate proceeds of the Gagauz wine harvest while offering little by way
of compensation from the other state revenues.

GagauzDebates
Demands
over the relative distribution of resources quickly led to

political

demands by many Gagauz leaders. Those demands are expressed in calls for a greater
degree of Gagauz autonomy or, a more radical option, a union with Transdniestria. The
latter, one should note, is general stated as a likely response to a hypothetical disastrous
situation that does not yet exist even in the eyes of the most radical.
Thus, the most elementary demand is for creation of a federalized Moldova in
which Comrat will share power with Chisinau. Tiraspol would represent the third element
in the three-way split envisioned by the supporters of a federal state. Micheal Kendiglian
expressed this demand upon his return from Moscow in late January, 2001 when he
declared that he could not imagine Moldova "as anything other than federation between
Chisinau, Comrat, and Tiraspol." 114
As the Soviet Union collapsed, the concept of autonomy gained not only great
popularity but also numerous quiet distinct meanings. The Gagauz concept of this term
involves several specific demands. Among the most important is one that is cited by
officials in both Comrat and Ceadir-Lunga, a removal of the disparities in the distribution
of economic benefits. Officials in Comrat are especially adamant in their accusations that
the Moldovan Parliament has not created equity in economic matters. The solution most
frequently offered in this context is the creation of customs posts along the roads into
Gagauzia. Such posts would be able to levy just benefits for the region while customs
officials in Chisinau deny Gagauzia its rightful share.
A second feature of the Gagauz concept of autonomy is the creation of political
parties that would be unique to this region. Denied under the Moldovan constitution,
these parties would participate only in local elections and would not be listed on the
national ballot. Kendiglian and other Gagauz leaders note the actions of the Mircea Druc
government in banning the Gagauz HaUry in discussing the need for their own political
organizations.
A third demand advanced by the Gagauz leadership, as noted above, is that
Gagauzia be granted more seats in the Moldovan Parliament, perhaps even as many as
one-fourth. This arrangement would help rectify the present situation in which there is
only one high level Gagauz, a deputy minister, in the current Moldovan government. The
call for more seats, presently, is non-negotiable and officials in Comrat say that they will
not participate in the upcoming Parliamentary elections unless Chisinau yields to this
demand.Closely related in terms of intensity, is a demand that Comrat be included in the
negotiation process concerning the future of Moldova. Failure to include Gagauzia as a
partner in this process represents, in the view of the confrontational element of the
Gagauz leadership, a denial of the legitimate status of the region. Moreover, according to
Kendiglian, he and his colleagues should play a greater part in the formation and
implementation of Moldovan foreign policy. Moldova, he maintains, has no option other
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such as Vasile Nedelciuc, Member of Parliament and ChairnL uf the Foreign Relations
Commission, have encouraged ties with Turkey as a way of limiting Russian influence
118
over Gagauzia.
Turkey began to demonstrate a more general interest in Moldova well before the
appearance of what might look like an opportunity for some moderate economic gains. It
was among the first states to grant diplomatic recognition to Moldova and follow through
with the establishment of full diplomatic activity in Moldova. Turkish President
Suleyman Demire\, after visiting Comrat and Ceadir-Lunga described Gagauzia as a
"bridge of friendship" between these two states. i In 1993, Turkey opened the "GagauzTurkish School", a university just outside of Ciadir-Lunga. The university offers classes
in Turkish, English, and Romanian. Turkey played an important role in the 1994
agreements on Gagauz autonomy by indicating that it would like to provide
developmental assistance and make investments in this region. More recently, a Turkish
firm secured the contract to remodel the Chisinau airport and BTR, a Turkish bank
already operating in Romania, opened an office in Chisinau where it quickly established a

reputation as one of the nation's most important banks.
While in the West much is made of the prospect of closer ties between Turkey
and this small ethnic community, the fact of the matter seems to be that most Gagauzians
have little fascination with Turkey. While no comprehensive data has been published,
Gagauz officials speak frankly about emigration trends among their people and maintain
that the nation that holds the greatest attraction is the United States. Religious converts
such as Baptists and Jehovah's Witnesses almost always emigrate to the United States
while Russian-speakers are inclined to move to Russia. Very few Gagauz emigrate to
Turkey. The most common pattern is that Gagauz women will journey to Turkey in
search of employment opportunities, marry Turkish men, and eventually claim Turkish
119

citizenship by virtue of those marriages.
While much is made of the Turkish associations of Gagauzia, its ties with
Romania may well be almost as important, though primarily in a philosophical sense.
There is a community of Gagauz intellectual democrats, largely based in Chisinau, who
are pro-Romanian in their orientations. According to them, the political evolution of
Moldova proper is inseparable from the political development of the Gagauz region.
Should Moldova be headed by "real democrats," then Gagauzia is more likely to be
governed by equally genuine democrats. In such a situation Gagauzia would likely come
into closer contact with Romania just as the Gagauz did between 1918-1940.
Professor St. Ciobanu has written about the loyalty of the Gagauz:
From all the minorities from Basarabia, the Gagauz population is the closest to the
Romanian nation through its spiritual qualities, loyalty and kindness of character.
All the Gagauzians speak perfect Romanian and in the Com rat region many of
them use both Romanian and Gagauz.
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Grigore Marakutsa, who frequently represents the DMR in its negotiations with
authorities of the Moldovan Republic, is the leader of the moderate opposition, He is an
advocate of less confrontational positions with regard to Chisinau while he is also
associated with calls for the implementation of a more regularized rule of law in the
DMR, He is a supporter of maintenance of the authority of the Supreme Soviet in
opposition to Smirnov's calls for increased ex.ecutive authority,
Vladimir Atamaniuk, the Speaker of the Supreme Soviet, has long been a
supporter of Smirnov, However, when Smirnov began to work to reduce the authority of
the Supreme Soviet, Atamaniuk opposed his former ally, Otherwise, in terms of his
advocacy of a generally hard-line position on other issues, Atamaniuk is still associated
with Smirnov,
One of the most important political organizations in the DMR is the Republic
Movement. This group is consistently pro-government and is regarded as an instrument
of Smirnov's political apparatus, It does not function in the manner of a conventional
political party but rather like the so-called "transmission belts" of the Stalinist period in
v
the Soviet Union, In 1997, during a crisis period in which Smirno was calling for
"greater vigilance," the Republic Movement played an important role in implementing
this can,Industrial unions and associations are also important in the political life of the
DMR, Their contemporary role corresponds to that of the trade unions of an earlier
v
Soviet period, During the crisis in the spring of 1997, Smirno held a series of public
sessions with the leaders of the unions and associations as a way of consolidating
support.Edinstvo, the political organization associated with Putin in Russia, has an office
in Tiraspol but this outpost of Russian political influence has been critical of Smirnov's
role in Transdniestria, In the December, 2000 elections, Eciinstvo won eight out of fortythree seats in the Supreme Soviet of the DMR, Consequently, its role is not especially
significant.

political
of the DMR
TheGoals
fundamental
political goal of the DMR is to enjoy equal status with the
Moldovan Republic within a "common state," In May, 2000, the DMR rejected
Moldova's offer, conveyed by President Petru Lucinschi himself, to give the DMR a
specified, guaranteed number of seats in the Moldovan Parliament and to make the DMR
president a vice-prime-minister of the Moldovan Republic, Because this offer did not
incorporate the notion of the DMR as the equal of the Moldovan Republic, it was
rejected,Sovereignty is the first political objective of the DMR, and securing the ability to
demonstrate that sovereignty is a necessary accompaniment. For Tiraspol's authorities, a
solution such as the one that was acceptable to the Gagauz will not work, A key
justification for this stance is the fact that the DMR has an economic potential that
ex.ceeds that of the largely agricultural Gagauzia, Thus, sovereignty (or independence, as
re
their leaders often say) rather than autonomy is the goal of the DMR.
The official view is further elaborated by Supreme Soviet Chairman Grigo
Marakutsa, a moderate, as noted above, who has declared that the minimal requirement of
the DMR is the creation of a confederation, with special emphasis on the ability to
demonstrate sovereignty in the areas of economy, culture, and politics,
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MGB head Shevtov, suspecting that Shevtov was transforming the MGB into an
instrument for his personal power.
Shevtov, who came to Tiraspol as a Major in the Soviet Ministry of Interior, has
broadened the activities of the Dniester Republic's MGB. His activities indicate a
primary concern with the domestic side of security. Accordingly, he has created a youth
movement, known as "Young Guard", which has what is widely perceived as a "Nazi
mentality" combined with an East-European version of New Age mysticism. AntiSemitism, xenophobia, and brutality have become the hallmark of Shevtov's youth
groups. Although they publish a newspaper that cannot be found on the newsstands, their
existence is not a secret and they can be seen on the street wearing distinctive clothing
that marks them as members of the DMR's "skin head" movement. Their newspaper,
entitled YOllth March, was prominent during the most recent election campaign when
11,000 copies were printer and distributed at no cost throughout the region. Membership
in the youth movement is confined to those aged 16 through 23.
While members of these groups routinely break the law, their parent agency, the
MGB, expresses little concern for this. In fact, their activities are consistent with those of
the MGB's young leadership, individuals who openly espouse a modern-day Stalinism.
The MGB's limited concern for the law is reflected in their apparent reluctance to
actually take cases to court. In fact, it is said that the MGB does not like to appear in
court and would rather deal with problems directly by using physical violence to
intimidate opponents. The only notable case taken to court by the MGB is that of the
I1ascu group, a case that has apparently taken most of the courts' time for almost a
decade.
The direct action approach of the MGB has been exhibited by its treatment of
businessmen attempting to operate in Transdniestria. Commercial endeavors, especially if
successful, often lead to arrest by MGB agents. Accepted police practice is that, after
enduring confinement for a period of weeks, most business people are willing to pay their
way out of jail and then out of the DMR itself. In the spring of 2000, the MGB targeted
illegal money traders whose practice had been routinely tolerated. Over fifty of them
were arrested and detained for two weeks. After that, they were allowed to buy their
freedom. As a result of this MGB "fund-raising" initiative, one million dollars wa,
collected and given to Smirnov.123 Today, the MGB controls most exchange outlets in the
DMR and all profits are used to enrich senior officials.
The activities of outside religious groups are an important security concern for the
DMR as it is for Russia. The most active of those religious communities is the Jehovah's
Witness group. Officials regard the Jehovah's Witnesses with suspicion and see its
skepticism about loyalty to the state as evidence of subversive intent. Consequently,
MGB officers now target them for harassment and arrest. All of the Jehovah's Witness
property, money, Bibles, literature, etc, is confiscated and, where it has any monetary
value, is turned over to the state.
Just as the activities of non-indigenous religious groups are seen as a security
threat, authorities are determined to suppress media outlets that are not controlled by the
state. Asket TV, operating in the suburbs of Tiraspol, has long felt the impact of such
repressive measures. Initially operating with a Western grant to encourage independent
media, the station was shut down by DMR authorities. It was not until 2000, after over a
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Attractive restaurants and modern stores, things that were almost non-existent in the
years after the war, have become much more Ctllnmon, Yet, the truth of the matter is that
such establishments are not routinely frequented by the average consumer.
For most people, economic life takes place on the street. According to
based in
independent journalist y, Voloui, an estimated 60% of all economic activity is 125
this area while no less than 80% of all food purchases are make on the street.
Street
vendors, some with small assortments of used items displayed for sale on blankets spread
on the sidewalk, others with tents offering new, perhaps Western products, account for
most of the commercial activity that affects the standard of living of most residents,
Prices, while still high when one considers the modest level of personal income for most
people, are much lower than those in the formal stores that line Lenin Boulevard, That
fact explains why the street vendors do such a brisk business while the stores are almost
empty, Equally important is the fact that there are two categories of customers, Most
common are those who work in factories, on farms, or in offices and institutes, Such
individuals, with their meager incomes, struggle to satisiy basic requirements of life and
are often paid in kind rather than in cash, Less numerous but more significant as members
of the DMR's elite are those who have connections in the numerous illegal enterprises
that seem to justify the existence of this Slavic enclave,
While the consumer good sector languishes, the DMR has enjoyed some recent
success in industrial production, While the Supreme Soviet set 20% as it targeted growth
for 2000, data released at the end of the year show that the region's industrial production
grew by 38%, Most of the growth was a result of successful years in metallurgy and light
industry with the Rybnitsa Steel Mills performing best. Textile and show production were
the only areas having a direct positive impact on the consumer goods picture, The
restructuring plans of the Supreme Soviet are credited with bringing back into production
five enterprises which had previously been dismissed as "hopelessly dead" just a few
years ago, Apparently recognizing the desirability of improving the overall economic
picture, the Supreme Soviet is now calling for introduction of far-reaching privatization
plans for 2001,126

Foreign Views of the Transdniesterian Conflict

Of all the foreign states having an impact on and an interest in the potential
instability of Moldova, none plays a more important role than Russia, Russian diplomats
are careful to describe their interests in terms that are consistent with the requirements of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), They express their
'determination to continue to participate in the three party negotiations on the status of
Moldova, As of early 200 I, the official Russian position was that the final solution of
Moldova's problems was in the hands of the leaders of the Moldovan Republic and those
of the DMR,
There has been Russian interest in helping the DMR and Moldova deal with this
problem, In accordance with a decision by President Putin, Russia has formed a special
commission to examine this dispute, The commission is headed by former Prime Minister
Yevgeni Primakov and is exploring the prospects for solutions to this persistent threat to
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the Ukrainian economic potential during a time when it faces the severe challenges of an
economic transition.
However, like the Russians, the Ukrainians see no reason to intervene in this
situation unless there is an eruption of large scale fighting. Given that unlikely scenario,
little change in Ukrainian policy is likely.
Nonetheless, support for the negotiation process has been a consistent hallmark of
both Russian and Ukrainian policy in Moldova. Their efforts in this regard, coupled with
OSCE activities, led to a renewal of interest in the peace process at the end of 2000. In
December, DMR Foreign Minister Valeri Litskai and Vasile Sturza, head of the
Moldovan Commission on the Dniester problem, met with Ukrainian and Russian
representatives in Budapest and announced that there would be a resumption of joint talks
and, hopefully, a strengthened prospect for peaceful resolution of this conflict. 128
Romania shares some of the concerns evidenced by the Ukrainians. The most
compelling matter expressed by the Romanians relate to the withdrawal of the Russian
weapons and military forces from Transdnicstria. One of Romania's most consistent
demands with regard to this issue is that an observer mission be introduced into the
region in order to evaluate the withdrawal of the Russian military forces and weapons as
well as the destruction of weapons.
Romanian officials also express a concern that Moldovan stability not be called
into question lest that issue would slow down the process of withdrawal. Closely related
to this issue is Romania's "ethnic interest" in a Moldovan population that is largely
Romanian. But there is also a political interest because of the geopolitical situation of
Moldova. Romanians describe Moldova as a bridge belween Eastern Europe and Western
Europe because of the cultural, economic and political influence which the Moldovans
have experienced for the last half century.
The Moldovan parliamentary elections are a special concern since they raise the
possibility that Moldova might bring about a rejection of Moldova's more open policies
of the past decade. It is a Romanian fear that such a move might create a broader version
of the Russian-Belarus alliance, something that would greatly change the nature of the
common frontier of Romania and Moldova.
While the Romanians express a concern about the status of fellow-Romanians in
the DMR, there has been no official intervention more dramatic than the awarding of
Parliamentarian status to DMR political prisoner lla~cu. Like the Russians and
Ukrainians, Romania would be alarmed by renewed violence. However, unlike the
Russians and Ukrainians, Romania lacks the necessary conditions to intervene in any
military capacity.
While there is a great deal of disagreement among various segments of the
political community in the DMR, there is a consensus about the necessity for foreign
intervention to bring about change. While some political actors fear intervention, others
see it as their only hope for real change. Should any form of intervention take place, it
would likely be taken by a member of this group of states -Russia, Ukraine, and
Romania. However, as noted above, the circumstances that would prompt intervention
are very narrow and, for the foreseeable future, unlikely to develop.
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Ties between Transdniestria and Gagauzia: In Quest of a Confederation
The most important connection between these two regions is that they were allies
in time. Their movements were bound not by a common ideology but were both
consequences of the upheavals of the first post-Soviet years. They were, for the most
part, simply products of a period rather than partners in secession from the Moldovan
Republic.
The strongest ties between these two entities existed before the 1995 Gagauz
elections. At that time, Stepan Topol, who had embraced much of Tiraspol's agenda, was
replaced as Bashkan of Gagauzia and the close relationship between the two leadership
groups ended. The current Bashkan, Dmitry Croitor, did much to reintegrate Gagauzia
into the Moldovan Republic. For the remainder of the decade, the most prominent
Gagauz politician to work for closer ties between Gagauzia and Transdniester has been
Mikhail Kendiglian, the Speaker of the Gagauz Parliament.
A rift emerged between the two groups as the Gagauz demonstrated a willingness
to accept Chisinau's offers of a special status for Gagauzia. In the eyes of many DMR
leaders, the Gagallz leadership was guilty of betrayal. There was, predictably, a
corresponding hostility against the leadership of the Moldovan Republic because that
group had been more conciliatory to Comrat than to Tiraspol.
The Moldovan political crises of 2000 and early 2001 saw a renewal of the
coordination of efforts between Comrat and Tiraspol. In July, 2000, Gagauzia opened an
office in Tiraspol to officially represent Gagauz interests in that area. The rhetoric of the
leaderships in both cities became increasingly strident over the summer.
This process continued throughout the year and, in December, when the Gagauz
Peoples' Assembly organized a Chisinau-based conference to voice their calls for
federalization, they were joined by representatives of the DMR. Together, they issued a
call for creation of a commission to develop a plan for power sharing between Chisinau
and Comrat. 129
While these two regions were initially allied by historical circumstances, their
more recent association has been the result of political convenience. They share an
interest in forcing Moldova to abandon the concept under which it was organized in the
first post-Soviet years. The issue, therefore, will not be resolved on the basis of which
best serves popular interests-a confederation or a federal union-but which will
advance the political agendas of Comrat and Tiraspol.
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